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Abstract. Motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias
both in experiments and in real markets, we study this phenomenon from a decision-
theoretic prospective, focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty. We develop
an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive the preferences of the agent for each
possible status quo option, and provide a characterization according to which the agent
prefers her status quo act if nothing better is feasible for a given set of possible priors.
We then show that, in this framework, the very presence of a status quo induces the
agent to be more uncertainty averse than she would be without a status quo option.
Finally, we apply the model to a financial choice problem and show that the presence
of status quo bias as modeled here might induce the presence of a risk premium even
with risk neutral agents.
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1. Introduction
A considerable amount of recent evidence has shown that individual decision mak-
ers often attach an additional value to their default options or status quo choice - a
phenomenon dubbed the status quo bias. Instances of this tendency have been noted
in numerous experiments and in real market observations, especially for 401(k) plans,
residential electrical services and car insurance.1
This evidence has not gone unnoticed in economic theory. In particular, non-trivial
explanations of the status quo bias phenomenon have been attempted by means of
reference-dependent choice models with loss aversion, as in Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) and Kahneman et al. (1991). More recently, a number of papers have analyzed
Department of Economics, New York University, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, USA. Ph.
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Bar-Isaac, Paolo Ghirardato, Massimo Marinacci, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, David Pearce, Debraj Ray,
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1See, among others, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Kahneman et al. (1991), Hartman et al. (1991),
Madrian and Shea (2001) and Ameriks and Zeldes (2004).
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this phenomenon from an axiomatic point of view without focusing on loss aversion.
In particular, these papers take as a primitive a choice correspondence or a preference
relation, and assume the presence of status quo bias at the outset, by means of behavioral
postulates. In turn, they provide characterizations that embody, per force, the status
quo bias phenomenon. Among these papers are Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2008), and
Sagi (2006).2
In the present paper we follow this second branch of the literature, and focus on a
characterization of a particular set of preference relations with a status quo bias. We
depart from the earlier approaches by concentrating on the effects of the status quo bias
in a specific setup, namely, that of preferences under uncertainty.3 That is, we focus
on the preferences over acts whose return depend on the realization of a state of the
nature, the probability of which is unknown to the agent. Indeed, it is precisely in this
sort of an environment that many real world examples of status quo bias are observed.
For instance, pension and/or insurance plans, the choices of which are well known to be
affected by this form of bias, are almost always viewed as acts whose consequences are
uncertain.
To illustrate the behavior that we aim to capture, consider the preferences of an agent
who currently holds a default option (act) as her status quo. Her task is to decide if she
should abandon her status quo and, if so, in favor of which alternative. Suppose that
all options she is comparing the status quo with have uncertain values. It is well known
that the ambiguity aversion of the agent may then well kick in, thereby reducing her
confidence in her ability to compare some alternatives. In this situation, it stands to
reason that the status quo might be particularly relevant for the agent. On the one hand,
this alternative is her default option, the most obvious candidate to prefer on the face
of the difficulties about comparing the feasible alternatives. On the other hand, it may
be something that the agent is “familiar” with, and hence she may feel “less worried”
about making a mistake by staying with it. By contrast, the other options may be
somewhat foreign and hence less attractive to her. Given this point of view, one might
expect the agent to be rather cautious in moving away from her status quo option. And
what does “cautious” mean in a setup with uncertainty? Following the classic works of
Bewley (1986) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), this may be modeled by postulating
the presence of a set of prior beliefs in the mind of the agent, and requiring that she
looks for an improvement for all of her prior beliefs before abandoning her status quo
choice. In fact, this is exactly what we shall find by means of an axiomatic approach.
Among the numerous papers that show the importance of the status quo option in
experiments, Roca et al. (2006) is of particular relevance for the present paper. In that
work, the authors present the subjects with an Ellsberg-type experiment, but instead
of asking them to choose directly, they first endow them with an option, and then ask
them whether they wish to exchange it for another one. It is found that the subjects
tend to retain their current endowment even when this endowment is ambiguous, and
2We refer to Masatlioglu and Ok (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the difference between this
approach and the one based on loss aversion.
3The loss aversion literature already contains models of decision making under uncertainty. See, for
instance, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Sugden (2003).
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the other alternatives are not. That is, from the perspective of revealed preference, they
act as if they were ambiguity seeking. This emphasizes well the relevance of the status
quo bias in this environment, and shows that this phenomenon may even overcome the
well-known power of ambiguity aversion. Such behavior is instead fully consistent with
the theory we shall develop below.
The idea that the case of uncertainty might be of special relevance for the study of
status quo bias is not new. In particular, the notion that the presence of uncertainty
might make the agent “confused,” and induce her to stay with her status quo act, was
first proposed, to the best of our knowledge, by Bewley (1986). Bewley suggests that
the presence of uncertainty might force the preference relation of the agent to become
incomplete. Moreover, he emphasizes the role of the status quo in this context with
the assumption of inertia, which says that the agent will remain with her status quo
unless there is something better according to her incomplete preference relation - this
postulate is very much in the same spirit of the status quo bias. The difference between
the present paper and Bewley (1986) is that the latter assumes an incomplete ordering
and inertia, and derives the characterization of the behavior involving dominance for a
set of priors. By contrast, here we posit the status quo bias behaviorally, and derive
that this must entail the presence of an underlying incomplete relation, which is, in
turn, modeled as in Bewley (1986) by means of multiple priors. In this sense, one
could see one of the contributions of this paper as to offering a behavioral justification
for the incompleteness of the preferences of the individual suggested by Bewley (1986):
an incompleteness directly connected with status quo bias. Furthermore, our analysis
includes the case without a status quo, and addresses the issue of what will the agent
prefer among many objects that are found to dominate the status quo option - something
that, by nature of incomplete preferences, could not have been addressed in the previous
works.
Besides Bewley (1986), the present paper has a connection also to Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005). One can think of the contribution of this work as a merging of the ideas
behind these two papers. Indeed, although we analyze a different primitive - we use
status-quo-dependent preferences and they use status-quo-dependent choice - some of
the axioms at the core of our analysis are derived from Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). But,
instead of focusing on the general (ordinal) case like these authors do, we focus on the
more specific model of preferences under uncertainty, and impose additional axioms that
are reasonable in this framework. (Our paper stands to that of Masatlioglu and Ok as
the (cardinal) utility analysis of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) stands to the (ordinal)
utility analysis of Debreu (1964).) Not surprisingly, the representation that we find is
related to the one found by Masatlioglu and Ok. While in our case, to abandon the status
quo, the agent requires dominance over a set of priors on the state space, in theirs the
agent requires dominance in an endogenous multi-utility space. Moreover, our tighter
characterization, coupled with additional properties specific to our representation (like
the full-dimensionality of the set of priors), allows us to draw additional interpretations
of the decision maker’s behavior, and especially to work out a connection with concepts
like ambiguity aversion, and to apply our model to instances in which the latter paper
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would have less to say, due to its generality.4 We refer to Section 2.3 and 4 for a more
detailed discussion.
Our analysis takes as a primitive a system of preference relations of the agent - one
for each possible status quo option, plus one for the case in which there is no status quo.
We impose two sets of axioms on these preferences. First, we posit some appropriate
versions of Continuity, Monotonicity, and Independence - the latter only on the decision
to retain the status quo or not. Second, we use two axioms that concern the connection
between the preferences of the agent with distinct status quo points. Among these, a
prominent role is played by the status quo bias axiom, which states that if an option
is preferred to another when it is not the status quo option, then it would be strictly
preferred when it is the status quo.
The first contribution of the paper is to show that these axioms are satisfied by a
system of preference relations if and only if it admits the following representation. The
agent has a utility function u on the outcome space and a set of prior beliefs Π on the
state space. When there is a status quo the agent acts as if she were “scared” of making
the wrong move, and requires dominance in expected utility with respect to all priors
in Π before moving away from her status quo. Thus, the presence of status quo bias
induces the agent to act on the basis of a multi-prior decision making procedure. To rank
options that both dominate the status quo in this sense, she aggregates the expected
utilities for each prior in a strictly increasing fashion. This latter decision rule is also
used in her choice without the status quo.
The second contribution of this paper is to show that this characterization allows us
to relate two apparently distinct concepts: status quo bias and ambiguity aversion. We
present three results on this matter. First, we show that, in our axiomatic framework,
the presence of a status quo increases, and in most cases strictly increases, the propensity
of individuals towards hedging - which is one of the way to express uncertainty aversion.
Second, we show that the presence of a constant status quo strictly increases the propen-
sity of agents to prefer constant acts - another way in which uncertainty aversion can
be expressed. This, however, is not true when the status quo is a non-constant act: in
this case we have a mixed effect, with the tendency to favor the acts that dominate the
status quo, even if they are non-constant - all in accordance to the cited experimental
results in Roca et al. (2006). Third, we show that if we require all the preferences in
our system to have a constant attitude towards hedging, then these preferences must be
uncertainty averse - and this must be the case also when there is no status quo. This
is true despite the fact that we have imposed no assumptions on the attitude towards
ambiguity of the agent: it is a pure consequence of status quo bias.
We then turn to show that minimal requirements of independence on the preference
without status quo are sufficient to obtain much tighter characterizations. First, we
establish that if we impose full independence on this preference, we can represent the
system of preferences by means of a utility function u, a set of priors Π and a single
prior ρ in its relative interior. The set of priors is used like before, while the single
4On a more technical note, our structure allows us to deal with a possibly infinite prize space, as opposed
to the case of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), in which finiteness is required.
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prior is used, with the same utility function, when there is no status quo, or between
alternatives that dominate it.
This last, tighter representation is however potentially too restrictive, since it imposes
that the agent is ambiguity neutral without a status quo - which we know is unrealistic.
We then relax the full independence of the preferences without status quo, and replace it
with c-independence and uncertainty aversion, much in line with Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989). We then obtain a representation that has a utility function and two sets of
priors, one in the relative interior of the other. The larger one is used to decide whether
to keep or not the status quo requiring dominance for all priors - like in Bewley (1986);
the smaller one is used in the other cases by comparing the minimal utility for all priors
- like in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). This representation allows us to see more clearly
how the presence of a status quo directly increases the “uncertainty” of the agent, by
making her use a strictly larger set of priors.
Finally, we apply the theory developed here to the case of decision-making in a fi-
nancial market. We show that, if the preferences of an agent satisfy our axioms and
the status quo is to choose an unambiguous act, then risk premia must emerge in this
market even if the agents are risk neutral, and ambiguity neutral without a status quo.
This result, of course, cannot be obtained within the realm of the standard expected
utility model. Moreover, if the agents were known to be risk averse, then our model
predicts that the risk premium observed in the market would be much higher than the
one predicted by the standard model. This might lead an economist who studies that
market by means of the standard model to think that the risk aversion of the agent is
implausibly high.5 We find here that the status quo bias phenomenon offers a simple
way of explaining this situation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our axiomatic frame-
work and our first characterization theorem. Section 3 analyzes the connection of this
first model with ambiguity aversion. In Section 4 we add some independence-type as-
sumptions on the preference without status quo and present two stronger characteriza-
tion theorems. Section 5 presents our application. Section 6 concludes. The proofs of
the main results are relegated to the Appendix.
2. A first model
2.1. The Basic Framework
We adopt the standard Anscombe-Aumann setup. We have a (non-empty) finite set
S of possible states of the world and a (non-empty) set X of consequences, which is
assumed to be a compact subset of a metric space. Let ∆(X) stand for the set of all
Borel probability measures (lotteries) on X. Denote by F the set of all acts, that is,
the set of all functions from S into ∆(X). For any p ∈ ∆(X), with a standard abuse
5In fact, the observation that only an implausibly high risk would justify the risk premium in real
financial markets is well known. This phenomenon is famously called the “equity premium puzzle.”
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of notation, we denote by p ∈ F the constant act the yields the consequence p at every
state.
We metrize F by the product Prokhorov metric. Fix the symbol  to denote an
object that does not belong to F . We are interested in a set of complete preference
relations {, {f}f∈F}. We view  as the preference relation of a rational decision
maker when she has no status quo alternative, and for each f ∈ F , we understand by
f the preference relation that rationalizes the choices of this agent when the status quo
is f . This interpretation prompts a particular restriction on such a system of preference
relations, because it presumes that the status quo, if exists, must be a feasible option.
That is, in studying choice that is rationalized by these preference relations, the status
quo must always be part of the feasible choice set. Consequently, we are not able to
assess the revealed preference between two acts g and h if neither is chosen when the
agent’s status quo is f . In other words, since f is the revealed preference from the
choice when f is the status quo, and since this status quo must be feasible, then if f is
the unique choice when only g and h are present, we cannot discuss the revealed ranking
between g and h (when f is the status quo) - after all, the agent will never be able
to express this ranking by her choice. Then, it seems reasonable to impose that this
ranking coincides with the agent ranking without the status quo. We shall refer to the
system of preferences that satisfy this restriction as consistent. More precisely:
Definition 1. A system of preference relations {, {f}f∈F} is a consistent system of
preferences if:
(1) for all τ ∈ F ∪ {}, τ is a complete preference relation on F ;
(2) for all f ∈ F , if f f g, h, then
g f h⇔ g  h.
Consistent systems of preferences will act as the primitives of our analysis.
2.2. Axioms
The axioms that we impose on the system of preferences can be split into two groups.
The first group consists of four axioms that are, respectively, the extensions of the
standard axioms to our setting.
We start with a monotonicity-type property. As usual, we first define the preorder D
on F as follows:
f D g iff f(s)  g(s) for all s ∈ S.
That is, we have f D g whenever what f returns is preferred to what g returns in every
possible state.
Axiom 1 (Weak Monotonicity). For any f, g ∈ F we have:
(a) If f . g, then f g g;
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(b) If f D g and g D f , then, for any h ∈ F
h f f ⇔ h g g,
and
f h h ⇔ g h h,
The rationale of part (a) is standard: the agent would be willing to abandon her status
quo if given something better for all states. In turn, part (b) says that if the agent is
indifferent between what two acts return in all possible states (that is, f D g D f), then
their comparisons with other acts are identical. In particular, if f is “beaten” by an
act h even when it is the status quo, then g should compare to h similarly; and if f is
preferred to h even when h is the status quo, so must g. Notably, with this axiom we
are implicitly assuming that no state is null.6
The core content of this axiom is to restrict the effects of the status quo to apply only
to the cases in which such monotone dominance does not pertain. Naturally, one could
easily imagine cases in which this latter postulate would not apply - the choice theory of
Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) focuses on this case. However, our goal here is to show how
status quo bias interacts with uncertainty, and therefore we focus on standard monotone
preferences.
We then turn to a postulate of continuity.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For any f, g ∈ F and any (fn), (gn) ∈ F∞ such that fn → f ,
gn → g:
(a) if gn  fn for all n, then g  f ;
(b) if f 4 g and gn f f for all n, then g f f ;
(c) if f 4 g and g fn fn for all n, then g f f .
Part (a) is a standard continuity postulate. In turn, parts (b) and (c) are the cor-
responding properties about the decision to keep or abandon the status quo, split into
upper hemicontinuity (part (b)) and lower hemicontinuity (part (c)).
We next impose an independence property.
Axiom 3 (Independence with SQ). For any f, g, h ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1],
g f f ⇔ λg + (1− λ)h λf+(1−λ)h λf + (1− λ)h.
This axiom imposes an independence-like property on one’s decision about whether
to keep the status quo or not. (A very similar axiom can be found in Sagi (2003)). From
a normative point of view, it retains the appeal of the standard independence axiom
of the Anscombe-Aumann theory. At the same time, it is restricted to the decision
about whether to keep or not to keep the status quo - without imposing this linearity in
6This restriction is made for mere simplicity: it is standard practice to weaken the axiom to refer only to
non-null states. Our results would then be identical, with the requirement that, in the representation,
the set of priors Π is full-dimensional within the subset of non-null states.
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general. As we shall see shortly, Axiom 3 allows for the presence of ambiguity aversion
with or without a status quo, while still providing a tight structure for our analysis.
Our assumptions so far relate the preferences with either a fixed or varying status quo
acts. Our second set of axioms regards the connection between the choices with and
without status quo.
Axiom 4 (Status Quo Irrelevance). For any f, g, h ∈ F such that g, h f f , we have
g f h ⇔ g  h.
In words, if we have two acts that both dominate the status quo, then its presence
should not affect their relative rank. Put differently, this property ensures that the
status quo has a distorting effect on one’s preferences only when it is chosen at least
against one of the elements; otherwise, it is “irrelevant” and the preferences with and
without status quo should be the same. To illustrate, consider the options {dine at a
French restaurant, dine at an Italian restaurant, eat pet food}. The idea of this axiom is
that, even if the option “eat pet food” is the status quo, it is so clearly dominated by the
other two alternatives that it will not affect one’s final choice. This Axiom, although
stated in different terms, merges the intuition behind Axioms SQI and D in Masatlioglu
and Ok (2005), and is the preference equivalent of Axiom SQI in Masatlioglu and Ok
(2008).
A caveat is called for here. In general, the presence of a status-quo option may have
two distinct effects: first, it may induce a desire to hold on to the default option (the
status-quo bias); second, it may induce a tendency to evaluate the alternatives in a menu
relative to the status quo (the reference effect). By imposing Axiom 4, our theory is
bound to focus especially on the first effect, and less on its reference effect - albeit, as
we shall see, some reference effect is still present. In particular, it does not allow an
undesirable status quo to act as a reference point that may affect the final choice of the
agent. By contrast, in the context of the example above, a reference dependent theory
would allow for the possibility that the status quo being “eat pet food” may make French
cuisine more attractive than Italian cuisine. (This resonates better with intuition if we
replace “eat pet food” with “eat left overs from previous night”, for instance.) Moreover,
it rules out the possibility that a certain status quo might alter the relative appeal of
two alternatives, unless one of these alternatives is not appealing enough to “beat” the
status quo. Again, this restricts the way in which a status quo alternative may act as a
reference point, thereby distancing our results from interpretations that are based more
on the reference effect (as in Kahneman et al. (1991)).7
We conclude with our main axiom.
Axiom 5 (Status Quo Bias). For any f, g ∈ F , if g f f or g  f , then g g f .
7This suggests that there is room for extending the present theory in a way that allows for status quo
choices exerting reference effects. Indeed, precisely this sort of an extension is carried out by the recent
work by Masatlioglu and Ok (2008). Our focus here, however, is to understand how a choice theory with
status quo bias can be developed under uncertainty, so we adopt as our basic framework the simpler
model in which the “reference” effects of status quo alternatives are kept to a minimum.
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This axiom posits exactly the effect we aim to characterize, and hence has a special
relevance for our work. It postulates that if an agent is willing to “move” to g from
her status quo option f , then she would strictly prefer g if g was presented to her as
her status quo point. This axiom, forcing the interpretation of the status quo as an
object that exerts “attraction” toward itself, is relatively standard in the literature on
status quo bias. Its formulation adapts Axiom SQB in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005),
corresponds to the one imposed by Sagi (2006) in terms of preferences, and, in turn, it is
closely related to the inertia assumption of the Knightian Uncertainty model of Bewley
(1986) and its applications.
2.3. A first characterization
In this section we present our first characterization theorem. A final bit of notation
is required for this. For any set Π of probability vectors on S and continuous function
u : X → R, we define the real map on Π UΠ,u(f) ∈ RΠ by
UΠ,u(f)(pi) :=
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Ef(s)(u).
Also, we denote by DΠ,u(f) the set
DΠ,u(f) := {g ∈ F :
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Eg(s)(u) ≥
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Ef(s)(u), for all pi ∈ Π, strictly for some}.
This is the set of all acts that dominate f in terms of all the expected utilities induced
by the set Π of priors. Finally, UΠ,u(F) is define as
UΠ,u(F) := {UΠ,u(f) : f ∈ F}.
We can now state our first result.
Theorem 1. A consistent system of preferences {, {f}f∈F} satisfies Axioms 1-5 if,
and only if, there exist a continuous function u : X → R, a unique, compact, (|S| −
1)-dimensional convex set Π of probability vectors on S, and a strictly increasing and
continuous functional ψ : UΠ,u(F)→ R such that for all f, g, h ∈ F :
(1) f  g ⇔ ψ(UΠ,u(f)) ≥ ψ(UΠ,u(g)),
and
f h g ⇔
[
f ∈ DΠ,u(h) , g /∈ DΠ,u(h)
]
(2)
or[
f, g ∈ DΠ,u(h) , ψ(UΠ,u(f)) ≥ ψ(UΠ,u(g))
]
or[
f, g /∈ DΠ,u(h) , ψ(UΠ,u(f)) ≥ ψ(UΠ,u(g))
]
.
Moreover, if there exist f, g ∈ F such that f g g, then Π is unique and u is unique
up to a positive affine transformation.
10 PIETRO ORTOLEVA
An agent whose preferences satisfy Axioms 1-5 can thus be thought of as one with a
utility function u over the prize space X, and a set Π of priors on the state space S (the
latter can be thought of a set of possible models of the world in the mind of the agent).
In order to decide whether to retain her status quo or not, the agent acts as “pessimist.”
If there is nothing better than her status quo option for all the models she considers, she
gets conservative and prefers to keep her status quo option. Otherwise, she aggregates
her evaluation in each of these models by means of some strictly increasing function ψ.
And, it is this very rule that she uses in the absence of status quo option. (This is a
consequence of our postulates on the relation of the preferences with and without status
quo - Axioms 4).
To illustrate the representation in Theorem 1, consider the case in which there are
two states of the world and the agent is facing the acts f, g and h, whose utility returns
are depicted in Figure 1. (Here, I(f, pi) represents the set of elements with the same
expected return of f , when this is computed using the prior pi.) We assume that ψ
is such that the agent’s preference without a status quo are the maximization of the
expected utility u computed using some prior ρ in the relative interior of Π. (In Section
4 we will discuss when this is the case). From the graph it is easy to see that, if there is
no status quo act, g would be the best alternative in {f, g, h}. By contrast, consider the
case in which f is the status quo. Let pi1 and pi2 be the extreme points of Π. It is then
easy to see from the graph that, if f is the status quo, the agent would instead prefer h
to both f and g. For, g has a lower return than f when the expected value is computed
using prior pi1, and therefore the agent does not want to move there from the status quo
f . Therefore, although g has a higher return than h for the prior ρ, f being the status
quo option induces the decision maker to prefer h ∈ DΠ,u(f). Again, it is “as if” the
agent wanted to be “sure” not to make the wrong move from her status quo choice f .
Of course, she has no qualms of moving to h in this regard, for h is better than f for
all of her priors. This is not the case for g, which is better than f for some, but not
for every prior belief in Π. Indeed, if h were not available, then the agent would remain
with f instead of moving to g, hence the status quo bias phenomenon.
As we discussed in the Introduction, Theorem 1 is connected to the Knightian Un-
certainty model of Bewley (1986) and the status quo bias model of Masatlioglu and
Ok (2005). In brief, our analysis comes down to combining the intuition behind the
Masatlioglu-Ok choice-with-status-quo model with the Anscombe-Aumann preference-
under-uncertainty model. Just like in Bewley (1986), the decision of whether to abandon
the status quo or not is modeled by requiring dominance for a set of priors. But unlike
it, the analysis here derives from assumptions on the relation of the preferences with dif-
ferent status quibus and not from incompleteness of preferences. Rather, we show that
status quo bias implies the presence of an underlying incomplete preference relation
that governs the choice of abandoning the status quo, and that satisfies the properties
suggested by Bewley (1986). From this point of view, one might see our contribution
as offering a behavioral justification for the incompleteness of preferences suggested by
Bewley - a justification based on status quo bias. Moreover, this approach allows us
to model in a unitary manner the preferences without status quo, or between elements
both dominating the status quo - something that, structurally, cannot be done in a setup
with incomplete preferences.
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Figure 1
The connection with Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) is also very strong. In fact, Theorem
1 amounts to translating their work from the analysis of choice in a general setup, to the
analysis of a system of preferences under uncertainty. In fact, the axiomatic structure
on the relation between preference with different status quibus (Axioms 4, 5) is derived
from theirs. (An even more similar version can be found in Masatlioglu and Ok (2008).)
Having said this, our focus on a setup of uncertainty allows us to extend their analysis
to an infinite set, and obtain a unique (cardinal) utility function and a set of priors,
as opposed to a set of (ordinal) utility functions. Furthermore, our representation has
an additional feature: namely, the full-dimensionality of the set of priors. This may
seem at first of only technical interest, but, in fact, it has rather strong consequences
for the potential applications of the model. For example, this property guarantees that,
as long as Axioms 1-5 are satisfied, the agent’s behavior must entail a gap between
her Willingness to Pay and her Willingness to Accept, which is not necessarily true in
the model of Masatlioglu and Ok (2005). As we shall see in Section 4, thanks to this
property, and to its tight characterization, we are able to apply our theory to areas in
which the choice theories of the previous papers on status quo bias lack predictive power.
Furthermore, this property allows us to identify relation of the characterized model with
ambiguity averse decision making, as we shall see in the next session.
3. Status quo bias, Ambiguity Aversion and coherent preferences
The representation described in Theorem 1, based on status quo bias, has a component
reminiscent of the models of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) or Maccheroni et al. (2006),
based on uncertainty aversion, or of the robust control preferences (Hansen and Sargent
(2000), Hansen and Sargent (2001), Strzalecki (2007)). In all of these models, the agent
makes her choice by using a set of priors with a strong degree of “pessimism.” This
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allows their models to incorporate uncertainty aversion within the realm of decision
making. By contrast, in our model multiplicity of priors arises due to the status quo
bias phenomenon. This suggests that there might be a connection between the traits of
uncertainty aversion and status quo bias. This section is devoted to the investigation of
this matter.
We attack the problem from three different perspectives. First, we go back to the
original notion of uncertainty aversion introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
which is a preference for hedging, and investigate whether the presence of a status quo
induces such tendency. Second, we consider the alternative notion of ambiguity aversion
introduced by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002), which allows us to make comparative
statements on the strengths of one’s ambiguity attitude. We will study if, and how, the
presence of a status quo modifies this attitude. Third, we investigate the consequences
of imposing a coherence requirement on one’s preferences in terms of like or dislike of
hedging.
3.1. Status quo bias and hedging
We now turn to investigate the relation of status quo bias and uncertainty aversion
in the sense of preference for hedging. The following definition is due to Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989).
Definition 2. A preference relation  on F is uncertainty averse if for any f, g ∈ F ,
f ∼ g ⇒ 1
2
f + 1
2
g  f.
It is uncertainty loving if for any f, g ∈ F ,
f ∼ g ⇒ f  1
2
f + 1
2
g.
It is uncertainty neutral if for any f, g ∈ F ,
f ∼ g ⇒ f ∼ 1
2
f + 1
2
g.
In order to understand how the presence of a status quo might affect the attitude
towards hedging, we introduce a comparative notion of such attitude.
Definition 3. Consider two preference relations 1,2 on F . We say that 1 is more
willing to hedge than 2 if, for every f, g ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1) with f 2 g, f 1 g we
have
αf + (1− α)g 2 g ⇒ αf + (1− α)g 1 g.
We say that 1 is strictly more willing to hedge than 2 if it is more willing to hedge
than 2 and the converse is not true.
The rationale of this comparative notion lies in the fact that uncertainty aversion
implies a weak preference for hedging - a mixture between two alternatives is better
then the worst of the two. (In fact, uncertainty aversion is stronger then this.) Now,
if we consider two preference relations, we wish to say that the first is (weakly) more
uncertainty averse then the second if it prefers to hedge whenever the other does. That is,
if the two preferences agree on how to rank two acts, then whenever the second preference
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likes a mixture of those better then one of the acts, so must the first preference - because
if the second preference liked to hedge there, the first must like it as well; hence Definition
3.
Proposition 1. Consider a consistent system of preferences {, {f}f∈F} that satisfies
Axioms 1-5. Then, for any f ∈ F , f is more willing to hedge than .
Within the context of Theorem 1, therefore, the presence of a status quo option induces
an agent to be more willing to hedge than she would have been without a status quo
option. In particular, notice that we do not assume that the agent has any preference for
hedging in any occasion: potentially, she could be ambiguity lover, and dislike hedging.
Notice, moreover, that this proposition “has a bite”: it is easy to show that if  is
uncertainty neutral or uncertainty lover, then for any f ∈ int(F), f is strictly more
willing to hedge than .
3.2. Status quo bias and preference for constant acts
An alternative way to define the notion of ambiguity aversion is suggested by Ghi-
rardato and Marinacci (2002), and it is based, instead on one’s willingness to hedge, on
one’s preference for constant acts.8
Definition 4. Consider two preference relations 1, 2 on F . We say that 2 is more
ambiguity averse than 1 if, for any f ∈ F and p ∈ ∆(X),
p 1 f ⇒ p 2 f.
and
p 1 f ⇒ p 2 f.
We say 2 is strictly more ambiguity averse than 1 if it is more ambiguity averse than
1 and the converse is not true.
The following result extends Proposition 1 to the context of comparison of one’s
attitude towards ambiguity with and without a status quo option.
Proposition 2. Consider a consistent system of preferences {, {f}f∈F} that satisfies
Axioms 1-5. Then, for any p ∈ ∆(X), p is strictly more ambiguity averse than .
Proposition 3. Consider a consistent system of preferences {, {f}f∈F} that satisfies
Axioms 1-5. Then, for any non-constant f ∈ int(F), there exist g ∈ F\{f} and q ∈
∆(X) such that
g f q and q  g.
Therefore, when the agent has a status quo option in the form of a constant act, she
becomes strictly more ambiguity averse than she was before. In particular, notice that
8This definition is connected to comparative uncertainty aversion if preferences are continuous and
satisfy c-independence. But as this latter property is not presumed here, a separate treatment of
comparative willingness to hedge and preferences for constant acts is necessary. And, as we shall see,
we will obtain different results.
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this is strict ; the presence of a status quo bias must have an effect on her behavior and
on her ambiguity aversion. By contrast, when her status quo is a non-constant act, then
the presence of a status quo induces a conflicting effect. In particular, Proposition 3
states that the agent might end up choosing a more ambiguous return - even if that act
is not the status quo. This will be the case for the elements dominating the status quo,
which, even if ambiguous, will be preferred to unambiguous acts that do not dominate
the status quo option. It might be worth noting that this finding conforms with the
empirical results of Roca et al. (2006), which show that agents may tend to act as
ambiguity lovers when they have an ambiguous status quo.
3.3. Rationalization by coherent preferences and ambiguity aversion
In what follows we say that a preference is coherent if it has a coherent attitude
towards uncertainty: if it is ever uncertainty averse or lover, then it should always be
(weakly) so. Formally:
Definition 5. A preference relation  on F is coherent if the following holds:
(1) if there exist f, g ∈ F such that 1
2
f + 1
2
g  f ∼ g, then we have h ∼ l  1
2
h+ 1
2
l
for no h, l ∈ F .
(2) if there exist f, g ∈ F such that f ∼ g  1
2
f + 1
2
g, then we have 1
2
h+ 1
2
l  h ∼ l
for no h, l ∈ F .
We are interested here in the case in which our preference relations {, {f}f∈F}
are coherent. Notice that by this we do not require that they are coherent between each
other. That is, f can be strictly uncertainty loving for some status quo act f , while 
or g for any g 6= f , can be strictly ambiguity averse. We require only that the agent
has the same attitude fixing the status quo; she is free to have a different attitudes with
different status quo options.
We are now ready to state our main result in this section.
Proposition 4. Consider a coherent system of preferences {, {f}f∈F} that satisfies
Axioms 1-5. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) f is coherent for all f ∈ F ∪ {};
(2)  and f are coherent for some f ∈ int(F);
(3) f is uncertainty averse for all f ∈ F ∪ {};
(4)  is uncertainty averse.
The postulates we have imposed on the system of preference relations, therefore, imply
that whenever we require that each of the preferences is coherent, then each of them
must be uncertainty averse - and, obviously, vice-versa. And further, this equivalence is
true even if we only require that only  is uncertainty averse, or only  and one of
the preferences is coherent for some status quo in the interior: each of these statements
are equivalent to saying that all preferences are coherent, and all ambiguity averse.
Therefore, if we consider coherence a desirable requirement - for at least one status quo
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and  - under the postulates of our model ambiguity aversion must be entailed for all
preferences in our system, including .
4. Stronger characterizations: some independence
4.1. Adding linearity without the status quo
In our analysis thus far we have imposed no independence-type postulates on the
preference without a status quo option. We now turn to investigate how their intro-
duction would affect our characterization. A natural first candidate is, of course, full
independence.
Axiom 6 (Independence without the SQ). For any f, g, h ∈ F and 0 < λ ≤ 1,
f  g iff λf + (1− λ)h  λg + (1− λ)h
It turns out that this postulate allows us to obtain a much neater characterization.
Theorem 2. A consistent system of preferences {, {f}f∈F} satisfies Axioms 1-5 if,
and only if, there exist a continuous function u : X → R, a unique, compact, (|S| − 1)-
dimensional convex set Π of probability vectors on S and a probability vector ρ in the
relative interior of Π, such that
(3) f  g ⇔
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)Ef(s)(u) ≥
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)Eg(s)(u),
and
f h g ⇔
[
f ∈ DΠ,u(h) , g /∈ DΠ,u(h)
]
(4)
or[
f, g ∈ DΠ,u(h) ,
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)Ef(s)(u) ≥
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)Eg(s)(u)
]
or[
f, g /∈ DΠ,u(h) ,
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)Ef(s)(u) ≥
∑
s∈S
ρ(s)Eg(s)(u)
]
.
Moreover, if there exist f, g ∈ F such that f g g, then Π and ρ are unique and u is
unique up to a positive affine transformation.
The agent whose preferences satisfy Axioms 1-6 can thus be thought of as one with
a utility function u over the prize space, a prior ρ, and a set Π of priors on S that are
“around” ρ (in the sense that ρ is in the relative interior of Π).9 This agent’s preferences
will then be as follows: when there is no status quo, she prefers the act that maximizes
the subjective expected utilities computed using the prior ρ and the utility u - just like
a standard Savagean agent. When she has a status quo act, however, she acts as if she
9Alternatively, standard results ensure that we could write this result with a measure µ over Π with
full support, and replace the prior ρ with the resultant of this measure.
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were “scared” of making the wrong move. In that case, she considers a set Π of priors,
and before abandoning her status quo she requires dominance in expected utility for
every one of these priors. If there are no acts dominating the status quo for each pi ∈ Π,
then she gets conservative and prefers her status quo. Otherwise, she chooses among
the acts that dominate her status quo - and only among them - and prefers those that
yield the highest expected utility relative to her original belief ρ.
There are two features of this characterization that are worth emphasizing. First, the
agent is guaranteed to use the same utility function in both the choice about keeping the
status quo, and the choice without any. Second, the single prior ρ of the agent is found
to lie in the relative interior of the full-dimensional set Π. This requirement, which again
appears to be technical, guarantees that the presence of a status quo makes our agent
strictly more ambiguity averse in every occasion. In a way, we have an agent who, when
she has a status quo, is expanding her set of priors in all possible directions - she is more
pessimistic in all possible sense. Once again, this is the feature that guarantees that
the results on the relation with ambiguity aversion that we have found in the previous
section would apply to this case as well.
4.2. A generalization to Ambiguity Aversion
The representation we have obtained with Theorem 2 implies that the agent must be
ambiguity neutral without a status quo: this is a direct consequence of independence
of the preference without a status quo option, Axiom 6. This, however, restricts the
presence of uncertainty aversion to the case in which there is a status quo option: in
fact, while our previous result entails that a status quo must induce uncertainty aversion,
at the same time it forces this uncertainty aversion to be limited to this case. The goal
of this section is to relax this requirement and to allow for the (more realistic) presence
of an ambiguity averse behavior even without a status quo option. We should therefore
expect to obtain a representation in which the agent is uncertainty averse in general,
and even more when she has a status quo. And this is precisely what we find.
In order to allow for a presence of uncertainty aversion, we need first of all to weaken
the independence axiom: following a standard approach in the literature, we replace
it with the c-independence and uncertainty aversion axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) - both imposed only on the preference without a status quo.
Axiom 7 (c-Affinity). For any f, g ∈ F , p ∈ ∆(X) and λ ∈ (0, 1],
f  g iff λf + (1− λ)p  λg + (1− λ)p.
Axiom 8 (Uncertainty Aversion without SQ).  is uncertainty averse.
By replacing independence (Axiom 9) with the weaker c-independence (Axiom 7)
above, and adding uncertainty aversion without the status quo (Axiom 8), we obtain
the following representation.
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Theorem 3. Consider a consistent system of preferences {, {f}f∈F}. The fol-
lowing three statements are equivalent:
(i) {, {f}f∈F} satisfies Axioms 1-5, 7 and 8;
(ii) {, {f}f∈F} satisfies Axioms 1-5, 7 and  and f are coherent for some
f ∈ int(F);
(iii) there exist a continuous function u : X → R, a unique, compact, (|S| − 1)-
dimensional convex set Π of probability vectors on S and a convex, compact
convex set Πˆ of probability vectors on S such that Πˆ ⊂ ri(Π), such that
(5) f  g ⇔ min
pi∈Πˆ
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Ef(s)(u) ≥ min
pi∈Πˆ
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Eg(s)(u),
and
f h g ⇔
[
f ∈ DΠ,u(h) , g /∈ DΠ,u(h)
]
(6)
or[
f, g ∈ DΠ,u(h) , min
pi∈Πˆ
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Ef(s)(u) ≥ min
pi∈Πˆ
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Eg(s)(u)
]
or[
f, g /∈ DΠ,u(h) , min
pi∈Πˆ
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Ef(s)(u) ≥ min
pi∈Πˆ
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Eg(s)(u)
]
.
Moreover, if there exist f, g ∈ F such that f g g, then Π and Πˆ are unique and u
is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
The interpretation of this representation is very similar to that of Theorem 2. In
fact, Theorem 3 extends Theorem 2 just like Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) extends the
classical Anscombe-Aumann representation theorem. Here, our agent has two sets of
priors, instead of a set and a single one. The first set, larger, she uses to decide whether
to keep the status quo or not; and the second, smaller and in the relative interior of the
first, she uses in the case of status quo option, or between elements both dominating
the status quo. This relative position of the two sets leads immediately to the results
discussed in Section 3: the presence of a status quo implies that the set of priors get
strictly larger, which we well know leads to strictly more uncertainty aversion. And just
like in the previous case, the latter being in the relative interior of the former means
that there is an increase in uncertainty aversion in all “directions”: the agent enlarges
the possibilities she considers - her pessimism - in all possible dimensions.
5. Application: Risk premium with risk neutral agents
We now turn to apply our representations to the analysis of a simple financial choice.
Our objective is to show that the decision making model captured by our Axioms entails
the presence of risk premia in a financial market with risk neutral participants. As it is
well known, if a market consists only of risk neutral standard expected utility maximizing
agents, a risk premium cannot possibly arise. By contrast, we will show below that this
is no longer the case when agents have a status quo bias, even though they might be
ambiguity neutral without a status quo. We will argue that it is the very presence of a
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status quo option that lead to the emergence of such risk premia. To do so, we will make
use of the results in Theorem 2, the relevant model for such enterprise.
Consider an economy in which there is one representative agent, a government and
a firm. There are two possible states of the world: s1, the “good state”, and s2, the
“bad state.” The government issues a bond, which is traded for the price pb and yields,
with certainty, $B. The firm can issue a stock, priced at price pst, which yields payoffs
$M and $m, respectively, in the two states of the world, where m < B < M . The
representative agent can choose whether to buy a stock, a bond, or not to invest. To
keep the analysis simple, we assume that only one of these three options can be taken.
More formally, define S := {s1, s2} and X := R. We focus on the preferences on three
acts: buy the stock, st; buy the bond, b; keep the money uninvested, ni. For any given
M,B,m, pst, pb, define these acts as: b(s) := B− pb for all s ∈ S; ni(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S;
st(s1) := M−pst and st(s2) := m−pst. Assume that the preferences of the agent in this
setup satisfies Axioms 1-5, 7-8. Then, there exist a utility function u on X, a single prior
ρ, and a full dimensional set of priors Π that rationalize her preferences in the manner
described in Theorem 2. Define the agent’s utility function on X as simply u(x) := x,
which guarantees her risk neutrality. Moreover, assume that her status quo or default
option is not to invest in the market.10
We also assume that in the economy there are market analysts who agree on a prob-
ability distribution pˆi on S (on the basis of, say, a suitable regression analysis), with full
support. Let us impose, again for simplicity, that M · pˆi(s1) +m · pˆi(s2) = B, that is, the
expected payoff of the stock and of the bond are the same with respect to the proba-
bility distribution declared by the analysts. This information is common knowledge in
the market, and we assume, for illustrative purposes, that ρ = pˆi. (That is, without a
status quo, the agent uses the prior suggested by the analysts.) Finally, consider the set
Π of priors, which we know to be not a singleton, and define pi as the prior in Π which
assigns the smallest probability to state s1. Again for illustrative purposes, assume that
B > pb > Mpi(s1) + mpi(s2).
11 We will now analyze the choice of the agent in this
environment.
First of all, since B > pb, buying the bond is certainly better then leaving the money
uninvested. Therefore, the agent would never choose to leave the money uninvested
if the bond was available. Notice also that, if the stock has the same price as the
bond, the agent would not buy it. This is because, if pst = pb, we have pst = pb >
Mpi(s1) +mpi(s2), which means that the expected return of buying the stock computed
using prior pi is negative, hence worse than the default option of leaving the money
uninvested. Therefore, since the stock is worse than the status quo for at least one prior
in the set Π, our model prescribes that it will not be chosen by the agent. Instead, she
would then buy the bond.
10This seems to be the most natural choice in this environment. Note, however, that we would get the
same result if the status quo were to invest in the bond.
11Notice that it is always possible to find pb that satisfies this condition, since the set Π of priors is
full-dimensional and pˆi lies in the relative interior of Π.
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This implies that if the stock is traded in the market, its price must be below that of
the bond, and in particular, below Mpi(s1) +mpi(s2). If this is the case, then the agent
buys only the stock (and not the bond). The implication of this is that the stock must
be priced below the price of the bond for it to be sold - although the bond and the stock
have the same expected payoff according to the market analysts and “according to the
agent” when she has no status quo.
Let us now compute the risk premium in this economy. First, notice in this case that
the risk-free rate is equal to the expected return of the bond, that is rb :=
B−pb
pb
. At the
same time, the expected return of the stock according to the market is
rs :=
Mpˆi(s1) +mpˆi(s2)− pt
pt
=
B − pt
pt
.
Since ps < pb, we then have rs > rb. This means that there is positive risk premium
in this economy, even though the agent is risk neutral. Obviously, such a case cannot
materialize with “standard” expected utility maximizing agents.
Notably, a risk premium emerges here in a situation where the status quo “do not
invest” is never chosen, whatever the price of the stock and the set of priors are. This
underlines an important feature of our model. The presence of the status quo might
affect the final choice of a decision maker even though it is not itself chosen. Hence, we
might have a role for the status quo “do not invest” also in more realistic situations, in
which many people do actually choose to invest. Of course, the same qualitative effect
would have been found if the status quo were buying the bond. Also, notice that this
risk premium is larger the “larger” the set of priors is. In particular, it depends on the
worst possible prior in the set Π. The more “pessimistic” the agent is, that is, the more
she is scared of moving away from the status quo to an uncertain alternative, the higher
the risk premium will be in the market.
Moreover, notice that, if an external observer (economist) studied this market, but
disregarded the role of the status quo by using the standard expected utility model, she
would erroneously deduce that the agent is risk averse. In particular, it is easy to see
that if the agent were really risk averse, then the risk premium would be even higher,
owing both to risk aversion and status quo bias. Consequently, if the external observer
disregarded the role of the latter, then she would attribute to the agent a much higher,
possibly implausible, level of risk aversion. This situation is not unfamiliar to the macro-
finance literature, where extremely high levels of risk aversion are required to justify the
risk premium observed in financial markets; this is dubbed the equity premium puzzle.
We see here that our choice theory provides an easy solution to this puzzle by deriving
it as a behavioral consequence of the status quo bias phenomenon.
This result is similar to the ones found by assuming ambiguity aversion in the sense of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), or robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent (2000,
2001), or incompleteness in the sense of Bewley (1986).12 Indeed, the models developed
12For the case of ambiguity aversion, see Chen and Epstein (2002) and Epstein and Wang (1994). For the
case of robust control, see Barillas et al. (2007). Notice, however, that the models based on ambiguity
aversion do not offer a term of comparison. This is not the case here, since in our characterization, as
well as in that of robustness, a unique prior is singled out as a natural term of comparison.
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in these papers would also yield a positive risk premium in this environment with risk
neutral agents.13 And, just as it is here, this is due to the presence of a set of priors,
and of a certain degree of pessimism. Our contribution is to show that this explanation
could be motivated by a completely different set of postulates. In particular, we show the
phenomenon may be caused by the status quo bias of the agents, even if the agent were
ambiguity neutral without a status quo, thereby further strengthening the argument in
favor of a multi-prior explanation of the observed risk premia.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our model can be similarly used to show that the
presence of a status quo might induce the existence of a range of prices for which agents
take neither a long nor a short position on a stock. This is similar to the results found by
Dow and da Costa Werlang (1992) - albeit, again, it would be obtained here by means
of the status quo bias phenomenon instead of ambiguity aversion.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed, axiomatically, three revealed preference models that
characterize a system of preference relations under uncertainty with multiple status
quibus. In all of them, the agent acts as if she had one von-Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function and multiple priors. She needs the weak dominance for all of her priors
(in the sense of expected utility), and strict for at least one, in order to prefer something
to her status quo option. This model combines the classical Knightian Uncertainty model
with the status quo bias phenomenon, and allows us to draw a connection between status
quo bias and ambiguity aversion. In addition, this model may be applied to the study of
investment decisions and might offer an insight to phenomena like the equity premium
puzzle.
Among the possible extensions of the model we have presented here, a natural candi-
date would be a theory that is able to derive endogenously the status quo alternatives,
without requiring these to be observable at the outset. However, it may not be best to
inquire into such an extension in our specific context. First, the problem of choice of the
status quo element is inherently dynamic, hence a dynamic model, as opposed to the
static one developed here, would presumably be required. Second, and more important,
the status quo bias case is only one among the many possible cases of reference depen-
dence, and among them is possibly the one in which the reference point is more likely to
be observable. If we are interested in a theory of endogenous reference point, it might
thus be better not to focus on the special case of the status quo bias, but rather on a
more generic situation of reference dependence.14
13As we have seen, although the same risk premium may arise, but the behavior might be different. In
particular, concerning the choice between elements that both dominate the status quo, our characteriza-
tion is such that the comparison is done according to a unique prior, while both ambiguity aversion and
robustness would induce the use of multiple priors in this case as well. If we used incomplete preferences
a’ la Bewley (1986), given the connections between these two works, we would have something very
similar. But as we have argued before, incomplete preference would have a (structural) limited ability
in helping us to model behavior, since they would not tell us what would be chosen if two elements were
to dominate the status quo.
14See Ok et al. (2007) for more on this matter.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
We consider first the “only if” part of the assertion. Let {, {f}f∈F} be a consistent system of
preferences that satisfies Axioms 1-5. For any f ∈ F and preorder  on F , denote by U the strict
upper contour set of f with respect to , that is, U(f) := {g ∈ F : g  f}. Moreover, for any
probabiliy vector pi on S and functional u : X → R, define Upi,u : F → R as
Upi,u(f) :=
∑
s∈S
pi(s)Ef(s)(u),
where Ef(s)(u) denotes the expected value of u with respect to the Borel probability measure f(s) on
X.
Claim 1. There exists a partial order  such that  completes  and
f h g ⇔
[
f  h , g  h](7)
or[
f, g  h , f  g
]
or[
f, g  h , f  g
]
.
Proof. Standard practice would allow us to translate Lemma 1 in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) to this
case, simply defining the system of preference relations {, {f}f∈F} as the only consistent one that
rationalizes the choice correspondence that is the primitive of their analysis. Following the Lemma, we
then obtain one partial order  and one complete order ∗ that rationalizes the choice without status
quo. But clearly this must coincide with , hence the result. 
It is easy to see that the partial order  here must be of the following form:
f  g ⇔ f g g.
Moreover, since  is continuous, standard arguments and Axiom 2 guarantee that there exist a con-
tinuous function v : F → R that represents .
We now characterize the incomplete preference relation . In order to do this, define ′ as ′:=
and ∼′:= {(f, g) ∈ F2 : f(s) ∼ g(s)for all s ∈ S}.
Claim 2. ′ is a preference relation.
Proof. Notice that all we have to show is that ′ satisfies transitivity. Notice also that it is an incomplete
relation that is derived by adding elements to the incomplete preference relation : all we have to show,
then, is that adding this additional relations still keeps the transitivity. Since the relations we are adding
are all of indifference, and the original ones are all strict, we have to show only two things. First, that
if f ′ g and g ∼′ h, then f  h, hence f ′ h: to see it, notice that f ′ h must derive from f  h;
but then Axiom 1 tells us that f  h, hence f ′ h. Same goes for showing that f ′ g and f ∼′ h,
then h  g, and this proves transitivity. 
Now, it is immediate to see that ′ 6= ∅ (from the fact that  6= 0 and Axiom 1), that ′ satisfies
Monotonicity (from Axiom 1), Upper and Lower Hemicontinuity (from Axiom 2), Independence (from
Axiom 3). We shall now show that ′ satisfies the Partial Completeness Axiom. That is, if p ∈ F is
the constant act returning p ∈ ∆(X) in all states, the induced preference relation ¯ on ∆(X)2 defined
by p¯q ⇔ p ′ q for all p, q ∈ ∆(X), is complete and ¯ 6= ∅.
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Claim 3. ′ satisfies the Partial Completeness Axiom. Moreover, ¯ 6= ∅.
Proof. Take p, q ∈ ∆(X). Notice that, since  is complete, then either p  q, or q  p or p ∼ q.
If we are in one of the first two cases, then Axiom 2 and the representation of  tell us that we have
p ′ q or q ′ p. Else, if p ∼ q, then by definition of ′ we have p ∼′ q. Hence, ′ is complete on
unambiguous acts, and so ¯ is complete. Finally, notice that since  6= ∅, then there exists p, q ∈ X
such that p  q, which means that ¯ 6= ∅. 
We then can apply Bewley’s Expected Utility Therem to characterize ′.
Claim 4. There exists a unique nonempty convex compact set Π of probability vectors on S and a
continuous utility function u : X → R such that, for all f, g ∈ F ,
f ′ g ⇔ Upi,u(f) ≥ Upi,u(g) for all pi ∈ Π.
Proof. Notice that ′ satisfies all requirements of Bewley’s Expected Utility Theorem, applying which
proves the result. 
We have therefore a characterization of the preference relation . Recall the definition of DΠ,u(f)
for f ∈ F , DΠ,u(f) := {g ∈ F : Upi,u(g) ≥ Upi,u(f) for all pi ∈ Π strictly for some}. Notice that, given
the characterization of our preference relation, then U(f) = DΠ,u(f) for all f ∈ F . By using this last
result, our characterization of  and Lemma 1, we get to the characterization in the Theorem.
We will now prove that the set Π is full dimensional in the simplex of R|S|, i.e. dim(Π) = |S| − 1.
The following notation is required. Given u : X → R, define v : ∆(X)→ R as v(x) := Ex(u).
Claim 5. dim(Π) = |S| − 1.
Proof. Say, by contradiction, that this is not the case, which means, since Π is a subset of the simplex of
R|S|, that dim(Π) < |S| − 1. Notice that this implies that there does not exist |S| linearly independent
element in Π, which in turn means that there exists x ∈ R|S|, x 6= 0 such that x · pi = 0 for all pi ∈ Π 15.
This implies that for all λ ∈ R, then λx · pi = 0 for each pi ∈ Π. Notice that without loss of generality
we can say that xs ∈ [−1, 1] and that u(X) = [−1, 1]. Now, consider two acts f, g ∈ F such that
v(f(s)) = xs and v(g(s)) = 12xs for all s ∈ S. Since, x 6= 0, then f 6= g. Since x · pi = 0 for all pi ∈ Π,
notice that we must have Upi,u(f) = 0 = Upi,u(g). Following the characterization of ′ in Claim 4, this
implies f ∼′ g. But this clearly contradicts the definition of ′. 
We now only need to prove that there exist a (point-wise) continuous function ψ : UΠ,u(F) → R
that is maximized in the choice without status quo. First of all, notice that, since  completes ′
and the latter satisfies standard monotonicity and partial completeness, so does the former. Moreover,
notice that, by standard arguments, there exists a function h : RS → R such that
v(f) = h((u(f(s))s∈S).
Moreover, continuity of v and u guarantee continuity of h, and monotonicity of  guarantee that h
is strictly increasing. Now, notice further that we can define another (continuous) function m : RS →
UΠ,u(F) which is an injection: this is possible thanks to the full dimensionality of Π. Now define
ψ : UΠ,u(F) → R as ψ(x) := h(m−1(x)), which is well-defined since m is an injection. Now notice
that we must that for any f ∈ F , ψ(UΠ,u(f)) = h(m−1(UΠ,u(f))) = h((u(f(s))s∈S) = v(f). Also,
notice that if we have f, g such that UΠ,u(f) > UΠ,u(g), then we must also have that m−1(UΠ,u(f)) =
(u(f(s)))s∈S > (u(g(s)))s∈S = m−1(UΠ,u(f)) (again also thanks to the full dimensionality of Π), which,
15The reason for this is that, if there were at least |S| linearly independent vectors in Π, then the system
of equations x · pi = 0 for all pi ∈ Π will admit only one solution, x = 0. But since this is not the case,
standard arguments in linear algebra points out that there is at least another non-zero solution.
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since h is strictly increasing, implies ψ(UΠ,u(f)) > ψ(UΠ,u(g)). We can then conclude that ψ is strictly
increasing.
We only need to show that ψ is (point-wise) continuous. To prove it, consider a sequence (xn) ∈
UΠ,u(F)∞, x ∈ UΠ,u(F) such that xn → x point-wise. We need to show that ψ(xn) → ψ(x). Now,
notice that the image of ψ must be compact by compactness of F and continuity of h. Consider therefore
a convergent subsequence ψ(xm). Also, consider a sequence (fm) ∈ F∞ such that xm = UΠ,u(fm).
Since F is compact, there exist a convergent subsequence fk → f for some f ∈ F . But notice that,
for continuity of u, we must have u((fk(s))s∈S → u((f(s))s∈S point-wise. But then, we must have
UΠ,u(f) = x, and by continuity of h and the definition of ψ we are done.
This concludes the proof of the “only if” direction. The uniqueness properties of our representation
are directly inherited from those in Bewley (1986), the representation of which we have used to prove
our result. We now turn to the if direction. The proof of Axioms 1, 3, 4 is either standard or trivial: we
are then left with Axioms 2 (Continuity) and Axiom 5 (Status Quo Bias). As for Continuity, continuity
of u and ψ and standard arguments guarantee part (a). Now consider part (b). Take (gn) ∈ F∞,
gn → g, gn f f for all n, and such that we do not have f D g. First notice that, if we had g D f , then
Axiom 1 would guarantee g f f , and we would be done. Assume this is not the case, i.e. we do not
have g D f . Notice that, for all n, gn f f implies Upi,u(gn) ≥ Upi,u(f) for all pi ∈ Π, strictly for some.
Hence, gn → g implies Upi,u(g) ≥ Upi,u(f) for all pi ∈ Π for continuity of u. Now, if this inequality holds
strictly for some pi ∈ Π, then g f f and we are done. We will now show that this must be the case.
Say not, hence we have Upi,u(g) = Upi,u(f) for all pi ∈ Π. This means that
∑
s∈S pis(v(g(s)−v(f(s)) = 0
for all pi ∈ Π. But this cannot happen because v(g(s))− v(f(s)) 6= 0 (since we do not have f D g and
g D f) and dim(Π) = |S| − 1 implies that the only z ∈ R|S| such that ∑s∈S zspis = 0 for all pi ∈ Π is
z = 0. For part (c), consider any f, g ∈ F , (fn) ∈ F∞, fn → f , g fn fn for all n, and we do not have
f D g. Notice again that if we had g D f the claim would follow from Axiom 1, so assume this is not
the case. Then, we must have Upi,u(g) ≥ Upi,u(fn) for all n and for all pi ∈ Π, strictly for some, which
implies Upi,u(g) ≥ Upi,u(f) for all pi ∈ Π. Again, if there exist a pi ∈ Π such that the inequality holds
strictly we are done, since it means that y ∈ c({x, y}, x). As we did for part (b), we shall now prove
that this must be the case: say not, then we have
∑
s∈S pis(v(g(s)− v(f(s)) = 0 for all pi ∈ Π, and that
both f D g and g D f are false. We have already shown that this is a contradiction.
As for Status Quo Bias, suppose that we have g f f . If f = g the claim is trivial. For f 6= g, we
want to show that g g f . Assume, by contradiction, that f g g. This implies that f ∈ DΠ,u(g);
at the same time, g f f implies g ∈ DΠ,u(f). But this is clearly impossible given the definition of
DΠ,u, since f 6= g. Finally, consider f, g,∈ F such that g  f . We need to show that g g f . Say,
by contradiction, that f g g. Notice that this implies f ∈ DΠ,u(g), hence Upi,u(f) ≥ Upi,u(g) for all
pi ∈ Π, and Up¯i,u(f) > Up¯i,u(g) for some p¯i ∈ Π. Since ψ is strictly increasing, this implies f  g, a
contradiction.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
For any ⊆ F × F , f ∈ F , define UCS(, f) as the upper contour set of  at f . Consider a
generic h ∈ F , α ∈ (0, 1), f, g ∈ F such that f  g, f h g. Notice that we need to show that
αf + (1 − α)g ∈ UCS(, g) implies αf + (1 − α)g ∈ UCS(h, g). Say first that g ∈ Uh. Since
f h g, by construction of h we must have f ∈ Uh. By Theorem 1 and by construction of h,
we know that UCS(h, g) = UCS(, g) ∩ (DΠ,u(h) ∪ {h}) for some u,Π constructed appropriately.
But notice that we must have Uh = DΠ,u(h), and therefore f, g ∈ DΠ,u(h). The latter set being
convex, in turns, implies αf + (1 − α)g ∈ DΠ,u(h). But then, αf + (1 − α)g ∈ UCS(, g) implies
αf + (1− α)g ∈ UCS(, g) ∩DΠ,u(h) as sought. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
To prove Proposition 2, consider u,Π, ψ as defined in Theorem 1. For any ⊆ F × F , f ∈ F ,
define UCS(, f) as the upper contour set of  at f . Consider any f, h ∈ F , x ∈ X such that
x ∈ UCS(, f). We need to show that we have x ∈ UCS(h, f) if h is a constant act. Say first that
we have f /∈ DΠ,u(h). Then, if x ∈ DΠ,u(h), then x h f by construction of h; if x /∈ DΠ,u(h), since we
have imposed that h and  must agree among the elements that are never chosen when h is present,
then again we must have x h f . If f ∈ DΠ,u(h), then by Theorem 1 and construction of h, we know
UCS(h, f) = UCS(, f) ∩DΠ,u(h). So, we only need to show that x ∈ DΠ,u(h) and we are done:
since both x and h are constant acts, we only need to show Ex[u] > Eh[u]. Now, say by contradiction
that we have Ex[u] ≤ Eh[u]. Since we have f ∈ DΠ,u(h), then it must be that Upi,u(f) ≥ Upi,u(h)
for all pi ∈ Π, strictly for some. At the same time, since we have assumed Ex[u] ≤ Eh[u], we must
have Upi,u(f) ≥ Upi,u(h) ≥ Upi,u(x) for all pi ∈ Π, where the first inequality is strict for some pi ∈ Π.
But this means that we must have ψ(UΠ,u(f)) > ψ(UΠ,u(x)), since ψ is strictly increasing. But this
contradicts x  f , proving the symmetric part of the comparative ambiguity aversion. The proof of
the asymmetric part is a trivial consequence. For any f, h ∈ F , x ∈ X, we have just argued that, if
x  f and f ∈ DΠ,u(h), then x ∈ DΠ,u(h). But Theorem 1 shows that h and  agree among
the elements within DΠ,u(f), and we have assumed that they agree within the elements that are both
outside of it: therefore we have the asymmetric part as well.
To prove Proposition 3, take h ∈ int(F), non-constant. For any  > 0, consider, if it exists, any act
f such that u(f(s)) − u(h(s)) =  (the existence of such f for  small enough is guaranteed by the
fact that h ∈ int(F)). Notice that we must obviously have f¯ h h by monotonicity. Now consider the
constant-equivalent of f and h under , i.e. x, h ∈ X such that x ∼ f and y ∼ h (the existence of
which is guaranteed by the continuity of ). We will now argue that, for  small enough, x /∈ DΠ,u(h).
Notice first of all that y /∈ DΠ,u(h), since we have y ∼ h, and hence ψ(UΠ,u(h)) = ψ(UΠ,u(y)), which
in turns implies, since h is not-constant, y constant and Π full dimensional, that there must be pi ∈ Π
such that Upi,u(h) > Upi,u(y).16 Therefore, y /∈ DΠ,u(h). Now notice that DΠ,u(h) ∪ {h} must be an
open set, and therefore, since u(x(s))→ u(y(s)) for all s ∈ S as → 0, we must have that x¯ /∈ DΠ,u(h)
for some ¯ small enough. But then, we have f¯, h ∈ F , x¯ ∈ X such that x¯ ∼ f¯ but f¯ h h h x¯,
giving us the desired result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
To show (1) ⇒ (3), notice that, for any f ∈ F , the upper-contour set of f at f is strictly convex
(since anything that is preferred to f must be return a higher expected utility for a full-dimensional
set of priors). This means that the preference must be strictly convex there, which in turns means, by
coherence, that it must be weakly convex everywhere, leading immediately to (3). The reverse, (3) ⇒
(1), is trivial, since any uncertainty averse preference is coherent. To prove (3)⇒ (4) it is also trivial: if
 is uncertainty averse, we are done. We only need to show (4) ⇒ (3). Notice that, by Theorem 1, it
is immediate to see that, for any f ∈ F , we must have UCS(f , f) = UCS(, f) ∩DΠ,u(f) (where Π
and u are chosen as in Theorem 1, UCS(, f) is defined as in the proof of Proposition 1). Notice that,
since DΠ,u(f) is clearly convex and UCS(, f) is convex by (4), then UCS(f , f) is convex, which
immediately leads to the result.
We now turn to prove the equivalency of (2). (1)⇒ (2) is trivial. To conclude the proof, we now show
that (2)⇒ (4). Assume (2) and say, by means of contradiction, that (4) does not hold, which means that
there are f, g ∈ F s.t. f ∼ g  12f + 12g. Since  is coherent, then it must be uncertainty loving. By
same arguments used above, it is trivial to show that if for some f ∈ int(F) s.t. f is coherent, then f
must be uncertainty averse. Since  is uncertainty loving and f is uncertainty averse, then they must
be uncertainty neutral when restricted to all the convex subsets of F in which they coincide. Define by
16The reason is, since h is not-constant, y constant and Π full dimensional, ψ(UΠ,u(h)) = ψ(UΠ,u(y))
can be true only if there are pi, pi′ ∈ Π such that Upi,u(h) > Upi,u(y) and Upi′,u(h) < Upi′,u(y).
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ext(Π) the set of extreme points of Π, and define the sets A := {g ∈ F : g f f}, B0 := {g ∈ F : f  g}
and, for all pi ∈ ext(Π), Bpi = {g ∈ F : Upi,u(g) > Upi,u(f) and Upi′,u(f) > Upi′,u(g) for some pi′ ∈ Π}.
Notice that all these sets are clearly convex, open, and full-dimensional, since f ∈ int(F). Moreover,
since φ is strictly increasing and Π is full dimensional, then for any pi ∈ ext(Π), Bpi must have a full
dimensional intersection with B0.
For any preference relation ˆ on F and any set A ⊆ F , define ˆ|A the restriction of ˆ on A. Now
notice that by Theorem 1, f and  must coincide when restricted to all those sets, and, as we have
argued, they must therefore be linear. This means that we can find a set of priors ρA, {ρBpi}pi∈Π such
that  |i =f |i are represented by Uρi,u for i ∈ {A} ∪ {B0} ∪ {Bpi}pi∈ext(Π). (To prove this, simply
notice that we can extend linearly  |Bi and then use the standard Anscombe-Aumann results to prove
the existence of these priors - this is standard practice). But also notice that, for every pi ∈ ext(Π),
ρBpi = ρB0 , since has we have argued Bpi and B0 must have a full-dimensional intersection, and therefore
the uniqueness of the prior in the representation forces them to be equal. But then, we have ρBpi = ρB0
for all pi ∈ ext(Π). If we the define B := (∪pi∈ext(Π)Bpi) ∪ B0, we have therefore a prior ρ = ρB0 on
S such that  |B =f |B are represented by Uρ,u. Let us now notice that also the set A is convex
and full dimensional, and that we must have  |A =f |A. Using the same arguments used above, it
is trivial to show that there exists a prior ρ′ on S such that the preferences restricted on A are both
represented by Uρ′,u. We now argue that we must have ρ = ρ′. To see why, notice that we must have
cl(B) ∪ A = F (where by cl(·) we understand the closure of a set). Say that ρ′ 6= ρ. Geometrically,
this means that the preferences  of the agent will be such that her indifferent curve will have kinks
at many points in A ∩ cl(B), and this will render them strictly convex on some interval (around some
kinks), strictly concave on others (around others). But we have argued that  must satisfy ambiguity
love, which means that its indifference curves cannot be concave anywhere. Hence ρ′ = ρ. But then, 
must be ambiguity neutral everywhere, a contradiction of our initial assumption that there are f, g ∈ F
s.t. f ∼ g  12f + 12g. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2 and 3
In what follows we will offer only a complete proof of Theorem 3, and not of Theorem 2: it is trivial
to notice that the latter is nothing but a special case of the former, from which it can be proved using
standard methods.
Notice first that Proposition 4 implies the equivalence between (1) and (2). We then only need to
show the equivalence between (1) and (3). The proof of (3) ⇒ (1) is trivial given Theorem 1. To prove
(1) ⇒ (3), follow the steps in the proof of Theorem 1 to define  and to characterize it. Notice that
since  completes  and that the latter is complete on constant acts, then they must agree on those.
Moreover, since  satisfies standard monotonicity, then so must do . Given Axioms 7 and 8, 
satisfies all the Axioms in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), which prove that there exist a closed and
convex set of priors Πˆ and a continuous function v : X → R such that  is represented by
V (f) = min
pi∈Πˆ
Upi,v(g).
We now only need to prove that we have v is a positive affine transformation of u, and that Πˆ ⊂ ri(Π)
to conclude the proof. Notice that the uniqueness properties of u and Π derive from Theorem 1 and
those of Πˆ derive from the uniqueness in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) (since if we have f g g for
some f, g ∈ F , then we must also have f  g, hence  is non-degenerate).
Claim 6. v is a positive affine transformation of u.
Proof. Notice that, since  is complete on constant acts (Claim 3), then we must have that  and 
agree on those, which immediately gives the desired equality. 
Claim 7. Πˆ ⊆ Π.
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Proof. Following Ghirardato et al. (2004), define as ∗ the unambiguously preferred preference relation
from , that is, the largest restriction of  that satisfies vNM independence. Since ∗ is a monotone,
affine and continuous preference relation, then it must have representation a’ la Bewley, with a compact
and convex set of priors Π˜ and utility u (which is the same utility used to represent  since ∗ coincides
with  on constant acts). As shown by Ghirardato et al. (2004), we must have Π˜ = Πˆ. Now, notice
that, since  is also an affine restriction of , then we must have that ∗ (weakly) completes  (since
∗ is defined as the largest affine restriction). But then, it is immediate to see that, since the utility is
the same, we must have Π˜ ⊆ Π, and therefore Πˆ ⊆ Π. 
Claim 8. Πˆ ⊂ ri(Π).
Proof. By contradiction, say that there exist ρ ∈ Πˆ such that ρ is a boundary point of Π relative to
aff(Π). Since Π is a convex subset of R|S|, then consider a non-trivial supporting hyperplane of Π at ρ
whose norm vector H¯ is such that H¯ ∈ [−1, 1].17 Now, notice that if α > 0, there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1)
such that ρ · (λH¯ + (1− λ)[−1, . . . ,−1]T ) = 0. Define H as H := λH¯ + (1− λ)[−1, . . . ,−1]T .18 So, we
have H such that ρ ·H = 0, pi ·H ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ Π, and p¯i ·H > 0 for some p¯i ∈ Π. Notice that we can
assume, without loss of generality, that u(X) = [−1, 1], and therefore we could find an act h ∈ F such
that Eh(s)[u] = Hs for all s ∈ S. Also, define g a constant act that return utility zero in every state,
that is, Eg(s)[u] = 0 for all s ∈ S. Notice that, since we have pi ·H ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ Π, and p¯i ·H > 0 for
some p¯i ∈ Π, then we must have h  g. Notice also that, since Πˆ ⊆ Π, then we have pi ·H ≥ 0 for all
pi ∈ Πˆ. This means that, since ρ ·H = 0, then ρ ·H = min
pi∈Πˆ
pi ·H, which in turn implies h ∼ g. But
this contradicts the fact that  completes , since we had h  g. 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3. Q.E.D.
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